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Latin American Economic Integration
GEORGE LOTT*
During the past few months, Latin American countries have
taken a number of initiatives in an effort to crystalize their frequently
expressed desire for regional economic integration. Within the An-
dean Common Market (ANCOM), the Cartegena Agreement Com-
mission approved the Arequipa Protocol, giving the group more time
in which to meet its objectives. An Andean Reserve Fund was set up
to help ANCOM member countries with any balance-of-payments
problems they might have. Latin America's newest integration group,
the Amazon Pact, came into being with the signing of the Tratado de
Cooperaci6n Amaz6nica. But, while these and other less publicized
advances attest to the continued viability of the concept of regional
economic cooperation within the Andean Common Market, the pro-
cess of economic integration within other Latin American integrative
groups appears to be in a state of lethargy, and, in the case of the
Caribbean Community, disintegration.
Latin American economic integration is the net result of coopera-
tion among sovereign states. Within the various integrative schemes,"
the actions of respective states are dictated in large part by forces of
nationalism, differences in economic development, and differences in
ideological outlook. All of these impact upon the processes of
economic integration and must be understood in order to account for
the success or failure of a particular economic integration body.
Inherent in any attempt to transform several individualistic na-
tional economies into a more unified system which would amalgamate
diverse national interests into a single system shared by all member
* J.D. Candidate 1979, University of Miami School of Law. Mr. Lott is an Arti-
cles and Comments Editor of the Lawyer of the Americas.
1. For a succinct listing and discussion of the origins and evolutions of Latin
America's economic integration groups, see Milenky, Latin America's Multilateral
Diplomacy: Integration, Disintegration and Interdependence, 53 INT'L AFFAIRS
(London) 73 (1977). A more theoretical analysis of Latin American economic groups
within the framework of models of integration is presented by Axline, Underde-
velopment, Dependence and Integration: the Politics of Regionalism in the Third
World, 31 INT'L ORGANIZATION 83 (1977). See also Bond, Regionalism in Latin
America: Prospects for the Latin American Economic System (SELA), 32 INT'L OR-
GANIZATIONS 401 (1978); Mytelka, Technological Dependence in the Andean Group,
32 INTL ORGANIZATIONS 101 (1978).
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states, is a network of competing goals. Because each member state is
economically unique, its willingness to cooperate in a regional
economic organization depends upon the ability of the organization to
aid that state in resolving its economic problems. Conversely, since
the organization's role is to transform the economies of a number of
lesser developed countries into a single, superior economic system,
this requires the extraction of concessions from each member state.
Viewing the events of recent months in light of this system of
competing goals, this survey focuses on the impact of recent econom-
ic developments upon the various integration schemes, and actions
taken by Latin American countries, either unilaterally or in concert,
that effect the dynamic process of economic integration.
THE ANDEAN COMMON MARKET (ANCOM)
As had been expected, the Cartagena Agreement Commission,
meeting in extraordinary session in Lima, in February 1978, moved
to extend all deadlines of the Cartagena Agreement which were
associated with the implementation of the common external and in-
ternal tariff reduction, 2 and the industrial development programs.
Unlike the 1976 Lima Protocol, 3 which amended the Cartagena
Agreement by extending implementation deadlines, the new amend-
ment, the Arequipa Protocol, 4 does not change the 1983 target date
set for tariff-free trade among Andean Pact members. Rather, re-
sponding to concern that the forthcoming presidential election in
Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia might prevent approval
of the proposed programs by the end of 1978, 5 the new amendment
merely extends, for one year, intermediate deadlines. The extension
was made in an effort to give Pact countries time to consolidate gains
they have already achieved in industrial development programming
(engineering, petrochemicals, metalworking, and automobiles), and to
approve other proposed programs which are still in the planning
stages (chemicals and pharmaceuticals, steel, fertilizer, and elec-
tronics).6 Speedy ratification of the Arequipa Protocol is predicted
2. Andean Group, June 1978, at 1-2.
3. See Comercio Exterior de Mexico, Mar. 1977, at 99-110.
4. The name of the protocol-Arequipa-is derived from the Peruvian city
where it was signed by the plenipotentiary representatives of the Pact's five member
countries.
5. Bus. Latin Am., May 3, 1978, at 142.
6. For a discussion of the Andean Pact's various programs, see Bus. Latin Am.,
Sept. 7, 1977, at 286 (automobiles); Bus. Latin Am., Dec. 14, 1977, at 398 (metal-
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but, there may be a problem with Colombia, which has yet to ratify
the Lima Protocol. Colombia will now have to ratify both the Lima
and Arequipa Protocols at the same time.
At the reconvening of the 24th Ordinary Session of the Car-
tegena Agreement Commission in May, the petrochemical and
metalworking programs were examined. Coining tinder particular
scrutiny was the reallocation of products assigned for production by
member countries which was necessitated by Chile's departure, and
Venezuela's entry into the Pact. 7 According to estimates released in
May, revising the metalworking program alone will involve the real-
location of products worth $343 million. 8 Two new decisions were
approved by the Commission: Decision 126 concerning the develop-
ment of Andean food technology, and Decision 127 which deals with
standard import and export certificates for agricultural products. 9 The
Commission also considered reports concerning the fourth meeting of
the Foreign Trade Council, which discussed, among other matters,
the common external tariff, tariff application legislation and tariff ex-
ceptions, uniform export incentives, special treatment for Bolivia and
Ecuador, and special rules of origin.' 0 A report was also received on
the prospects for joint industrial development programs with Argen-
tina, Brazil, and Mexico in the areas of automobile manufacturing,
metalworking, and petrochemicals. Andean-Argentine and Andean-
Mexican committees are expected to meet later this year." 1
Recently released statistics reveal that, even though 1977 was the
first full year since Chile's withdrawal from the Pact in late 1976,
Andean Pact trade with the rest of the world increased by 15.4% in
1977 to $30 billion, compared with $26 billion in 1976. The statistics
indicate that the Pact's five member countries achieved a trade
working); Bus. Latin Am., Mar. 1, 1978, at 69 (chemicals); Bus. Latin Am., Mar. 15,
1978, at 85 (electronics); and, Bus. Latin Am., Mar. 29, 1978, at 100 (pharmaceuti-
cals).
7. Comercio Exterior de Mexico, June 1978, at 270; Andean Group, July 1978, at 3.
8. Andean Group, May 1978, at 6.
9. Latin Am. Econ. Report, Mar. 3, 1978, at 65.
10. Id. For an account of the Foreign Trade Council's meeting, see Andean
Group., Mar. 1978, at 2.
11. Comercio Exterior de Mexico, June 1978, at 270. For an account of the An-
dean working group which studied the possibility of joint industrial ventures with
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico (known to the press in'the Andean countries by the
generic name Abramex), see Andean Group, May 1978, at 5.
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surplus with the rest of the world in 1977, with exports of $15.8 bil-
lion compared to imports of $14 billion, resulting in a favorable bal-
ance of $1,799 billion. Inter-Andean trade also rose sharply in 1977 to
$775.2 million, a twenty-two percent increase over 1976's $643.3,mil-
lion. 12
In April, the Automotive Industry Committee met in Lima
where top automotive specialists from each of the Andean Pact coun-
tries discussed the standardization of parts and components, and re-
ported on the member countries' progress toward choosing basic
models. A report was also presented by the Junta-the Pact's techni-
cal integrative body-of costs, levels of vehicle component integra-
tion, production statistics, and technical specifications for new agree-
ments. '
3
In March, representatives of nine foreign automobile companies
gathered in La Paz and Quito to present final bids for participation in
the Bolivian and Ecuadorian allocations of the Andean Automotive
Program. 14 Bolivia announced in April, that its contract to produce
medium weight trucks had been awarded to Mercedes-Benz."a
Mercedes-Benz will now form a mixed company with the state Comi-
si6n Nacional Automotriz which is made up of representatives from
industry, commerce, and the Bolivian Armed Forces Development
Corporation (COFADENA). The Bolivian armed forces, it has been
reported, regard the automotive industry as strategic to the country's
development and are insisting on participating in the foundry and
assembly plant. 16
Fiat and Renault are expanding their operations in Colombia;
and Venezuela, which has already signed contracts with Fiat and
Pegaso, announced that General Motors and Renault have been
selected to build six-cylinder engines for the Andean market. Peru,
with the exception of a contract with Volvo to assemble heavy trucks
and buses, has yet to award any contracts. 1 7
12. Noticias, June 26, 1978, at 2.
13. Andean Group, June 1978, at 4.
14. Latin Am. Econ. Report, April 21, 1978, at 117.
15. Noticias, July 10, 1978, at 5.
16. Latin Am. Econ. Report, April 21, 1978, at 117.
17. Latin Am. Econ. Report, Mar. 3, 1978, at 65. For a current checklist of
companies selected by Andean countries to participate in production under the An-
dean Automobile Program, see Latin Am. Econ. Report, Aug. 11, 1978, at 244.
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Bolivia's automobile production allocation is estimated to far ex-
ceed its internal market demand, and hopes are high in government
circles that Bolivia will finally gain something from its membership in
the Andean Pact which, until now, has more often been a source of
frustration.' 8  As the least developed member of the Andean Pact
countries, Bolivia requires special treatment. The normal difficulties
of setting up an industry are exacerbated by the country's poor infra-
structure and the need to import most raw materials. Inevitably, costs
are increased, making other Andean Pact members reluctant to
purchase Bolivian products. An example is the current controversy
over Aquila S.A., the Bolivian business which has been planned to
manufacture the pesticides assigned to Bolivia under the Andean
Chemical Program and LAFTA Complementation Agreement No. 6.
Colombia, which would be the principal buyer of Aquila's output,
since it consumes fifty-five percent of all pesticides sold by the An-
dean Pact countries, has objected that, if it were obliged to use Boli-
vian pesticides, the production costs of its agricultural commodities
would skyrocket. To resolve the dilemma, it was announced in March
that Colombia would join the venture as a partner, holding fifteen
percent of the equity, with Bolivia, Argentina, and the Andean De-
velopment Corporation (CAF) holding equities of thirty-five percent,
forty-five percent, and five percent, respectively. There are still
doubts about Colombia's commitment, however, and if the Aquila
project collapses, Bolivia, feeling that the benefits do not justify its
membership, might decide to follow through on its frequently re-
peated threats to withdraw from the Pact. 9
In other developments, the CAF, at its board meeting in March,
approved credits amounting to $71 million; $38.5 million to Colom-
bia, $9.5 million to Ecuador, and $23 million to Peru.2 0 Colombia
will use its loan to finance a refinery in Cartegena which will process
Venezuelan petroleum and, according to the press, serve as one of
the most important cornerstones of integration between the two coun-
tries, 2 ' It was announced in June that CAF was granting Bolivia a
credit of $36 million to help finance Bolivia's embryonic automobile
industry. 22 The CAF has also agreed to issue $70 million worth of
18. Latin Am. Econ. Report, April 21, 1978, at 117.
19. Bus. Latin Am., May 31, 1978, at 170.
20. Latin Am. Econ. Report, April 7, 1978, at 103.1.
21. The Times of the Americas, April 12, 1978, at 3, col. 2.
22. Andean Group, June 1978, at 7.
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bonds, of which $60 million will be purchased by the Venezuelan
Development Fund. The remainder will be placed on the Venezuelan
stock market. 2
3
According to recent estimates, the five Andean Pact countries
will need to raise $33 billion over the next eight to ten years if they
are to carry out, within prescribed deadlines, the Pact's industrial
development programs. Because of the difficulties in raising such a
vast amount over such a relatively short period, it has been suggested
that consideration be given to rearranging the Pact's priorities and,
possibly, slowing the growth of the integration process. Since the
CAF will play such a central role in raising the $33 billion, an advi-
sory committee within the CAF is currently considering the possibil-
ity of reorganizing the Pact.
24
Upon ratification by Venezuela and Peru of the proposal,2 5 the
Andean Pactset up its long-awaited Andean Reserve Fund. Designed
to aid member countries with balance-of payments problems, the
Fund will grant credits directly to needy members and act as a
gurantor for loans made by third parties. It is also intended that the
Fund will aid in the task of harmonizing member's exchange, mone-
tary and financial policies. The capital base of the Fund will be $240
million, with Colombia, Peru and Venezuela each contributing $60
million, and Bolivia and Ecuador $30 million each. 26  Besides its ob-
vious value in aiding member countries ailing economies, the Fund's
creation will help increase the unity and solidarity within the Andean
Pact. Bolivia, the Pact's weakest member, has threatened more than
once to withdraw from the Pact unless it receives special treatment.
By making available to Bolivia a credit line of up to $105 million, 27
the Fund provides the kind of special treatment demanded by
Bolivia. In addition, at a time when, despite the Pact's apparent
strength, one member statesman is speaking of its imminent col-
lapse, 28 the Fund reaffirms the viability of ANCOM and its capacity
to facilitate trade and regional projects.
23. Latin Am. Econ. Report, April 7, 1978, at 103.
24. Noticias, May 15, 1978, at 2.
25. Each country announced its ratification in June 1978. See Andean Group,
June 1978, at 3 (Venezuela); and, Noticias, June 12, 1978, at 2 (Peru).
26. Bus. Latin Am., July 26, 1978, at 236.
27. According to Andean sources, Ecuador will also be able to draw up to $105
million, with Peru's credit line extending upwards to $150 million. Bus. Latin Am.,
July 26, 1978, at 236.
28. Immediately before the inauguration of President-elect Julio Csar, on Aug.
7, 1978, ex-Colombian President Lopez Michelsen began referring openly to the An-
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THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET (CACM)
Since the ratification of the Treaty of Mediation by El Salvador
and Honduras in late 1977,29 marked progress has been made toward
the reestablishment of diplomatic and commercial ties between the
two CACM partners. Following an unofficial meeting between Sal-
vadorean President Romero and Honduran President Melgar Castro
in April, 30 the foreign ministers of the two countries met for talks
aimed at settling the eight-year-old dispute.3 1 At the meeting, the
foreign ministers of both countries hinted that the differences be-
tween the two countries may be moving toward some resolution. At
one point the defense minister indicated that a treaty could be signed
this year. 32
Currently, El Salvador and Honduras continue to suffer consid-
erable economic disadvantages as a result of their conflict. In the past
eight years Guatemala has become the major supplier of industrial
products to Honduras, and the main supplier of basic grains to El
Salvador, thereby filling the vacuum created when the latter two
countries broke off diplomatic and trade relations with one another.
Honduras has deeply felt the absence of Salvadorean capital and
skilled labor, which were an integral part of Honduran economic de-
velopment before the conflict. El Salvador has been affected by the
closing of the Honduran market for its industrial products, and its
search for new markets outside the area has met with little success.
Thus, the reestablishment of relations between the two countries
would almost certainly lead to a strong increase in intraregional trade,
not only because of the opening of a new market for each country,
but also because El Salvador's access to other countries (and vice
versa) would be greatly improved once its products could legitimately
travel through Honduras. 33
Nevertheless, deep political differences remain, and coupled
with the political unrest currently plaguing each country,3 4 a peace
dean Pact's imminent disintegration and spoke warmly of Chile's market economy,
suggesting that it took the right course in withdrawing from the Pact in 1976. Latin
Am. Pol. Report, Aug. 11, 1978, at 245.
29. For a background discussion of that development, see generally Law. Am.
(1978).
30. Comercio Exterior de Mexico, June 1978, at 267.
31. Latin Am. Pol. Report, May 5, 1978, at 136.
32. Q. Econ. Rev. Quat., El. Sal., Hood., May-Aug. 1978, at 7.
33. Id. Comercio Exterior de Mexico, supra note 30, at 267.
34. See Q. Econ., Rev. Guat., El Sal., Hond., Jan.-April 1978, at 17, 22.
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treaty by the end of 1978 may be unrealistic. Indeed, optimism that a
signing may be in the offing was tempered by the May 1978, an-
nouncement of a recent arms purchase by Honduras from Britain.35
While it is hoped that the successful conclusion of the El
Salvador-Honduras conflict will reawaken interest in Central Ameri-
ca's economic integration, it is not likely that it will automatically lead
to a restructuring of CACM. However, at a time when prices for the
region's primary export commodities-coffee, sugar, cotton, and
bananas-are falling, 36 a peace treaty could, perhaps, cause more
serious consideration to be given to the proposals of the SecretariAt
Permanente de Integraci6n Econ6mica Centroamericana (SEICA) for
the creation of a new Central American Economic and Social Com-
munity (CESCA).3 7  In fairness, however, the transition phase in
which Central American integration presently finds itself has not been
completely devoid of progress. Several instruments were recently ap-
proved, including the Regulations to Article IX of the General Treaty,
and the Third Protocol to the Central American Agreements on Fiscal
Incentives to Industrial Development, together with its correspond-
ing regulations. Joint action was also agreed to on the setting up and
implementation of a common Central American trade policy, which
would principally affect the marketing of sugar, meat, and other basic
commodities."'
Nicaragua has put further strains on the already shaky unity of
CACM by imposing a thirty percent duty on imports from other
CACM countries. CACM's market regulations stipulate tariff exemp-
tion for products traded within the region.
39
Recent statistical comparisons attest to the importance of integra-
tion in stimulating trade between CACM countries. From a total of
$287 million in 1970, Central American trade grew to $542 million in
1974-a gain of eighty-nine percent, and to $703 million in 1977-a
gain of 15.4%.4 0 In particular, Guatemala's trade with its CACM
35. Latin Am, Pol. Report, May 5, 1978, at 136.
36. Q. Econ., Rev., Guat., El Sal., Hond., supra note 32, at 7-9; Bus. Latin
Am., Mar. 15, 1978, at 81.
37. Although the proposed draft of the Central American Economic and Social
Community (CESCA) Treaty was given to the Heads of State of CACM's member
countries on Mar. 23, 1976, it has met considerable delay and opposition. See
Comercio Exterior de Mexico, July 1976, at 264-266.
38. Comercio Exterior de Mexico, supra note 30, at 267.
39. Noticias, July 31, 1978, at 2.
40. Comercio Exterior de Mexico, supra note 30, at 267.
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partners rose from $218 million in 1976 to $256 million in 1977, a
seventeen percent gain. 4 1 El Salvador remains Guatemala's principal
trade partner, taking almost fifty percent of Guatemala's exports.
Costa Rica and Nicaragua follow with twenty percent and Honduras
with ten percent. El Salvador's CACM trade is also rising steadily,
but the balance does not favor El Salvador. 42 In 1977, exports were
$150 million and imports $201 million, for a $51 million deficit, com-
pared with a $37 million deficit in 1976.
At the Third Annual Central American Conference in January
1978, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) proposed the
creation of a Central American Investment Bank, in a further attempt
to mobilize additional financial resources for Central America's in-
dustrial development. Under the proposal, half of the investment
bank's capital base would come from Central American sources, with
the remainder coining from sources such as the World Bank and the
IDB. The importance of the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration (CABEI) to the creation of any such institution was also
stressed.
4 3
LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM (SELA)
The Sistema Econ6mica Latinoamnericano (SELA) held its Fourth
Council meeting in Caraballeda, Venezuela from April 3 to 5. The
meeting was attended by representatives from twenty-five Latin
American countries. At the meeting, seven regional projects for coop-
eration were discussed and several important decisions, including one
which will facilitate Latin American coordination at the international
level were adopted. In addition, the Council increased the number of
countries represented on various action committees, continued
negotiations toward the setting up of multinational enterprises, issued
a statement of intent to step up regional cooperation in technology,
and approved Surinam's incorporation into SELA as that organiza-
tion's twenty-sixth member. 44  A special meeting was held in late
April to define the terms of reference which are to be applied to a
regional network for technology information, the Red de Informacitn
Tecnol6gica (RITLA),4 5 According to SELA, a high volume of
41. Bus. Latin Am., April 19, 1978, at 125.
42. Bus. Latin Am., June 21, 1978, at 197.
43. IDB News, No. 2, April 1978, at Insert.
44. Comercio Exterior de Mexico, May 1978, at 228; IXX Venezuela Up -To-Date,
Summer 1978, at 18.
45. Latin Am. Econ. Report, May 5, 1978, at 130.
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technology will be required as Latin American economies grow from
five percent to 6.3% during the 1980's. In an attempt to assure that
most of this technology comes from Latin American sources, RITLA
will be designed to identify and distribute the region's existing
technology, compile directories of engineering firms, stimulate in-
vestment projects and assimilate the experience gained in negotiating
technology contracts. Latin American sources hope that RITLA will
reduce the area's reliance upon technology brought in by transna-
tional corporations.46
THE LATIN AMERICAN FREE TRADE ASSOCIATION (LAFTA)
In contrast with the absence of any general organizational initia-
tive to revitalize the Latin American Free Trade Association
(LAFTA), several sectorial meetings have been held during the past
few months. However, the results of these meetings have been rela-
tively unimpressive.
Aluminum industry representatives met in Montevideo, in April,
to recommend tariff-cutting measures for the association. But, while
the meeting was well attended and information was exchanged on the
state of the aluminum industry in member countries, no consensus
was reached on a complementation agreement.4 7 The Sixth Meeting
of the Graphics Industry was also held in April. Since the member
countries had failed to act on a previously drawn-up complementation
agreement for the industry, no new tariff cuts were proposed. Argen-
tina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, the "big four" behind the proposed
agreement, reiterated their interest in the accord and emphasized
that its terms are still valid. With interest waning at governmental
levels, however, the proposal is unlikely to come to fruition. 48 LAF-
TA's most active sectorial group, the electrical equipment sectorial,
met recently in Bariloche, Argentina, where over fifty international
firms were represented, including Burroughs, Gillette, 3M, Philips,
Standard Electric, and Union Carbide. Despite past success, how-
ever, the group, succumbing to the general malaise of LAFTA, pro-
posed no new complementation agreements. Instead, the sector's five
subgroups concentrated on extending concessions previously granted
on a temporary basis and on expanding two existing accords; No.23 by
46. Id.
47. Bus. Latin Am., April 19, 1978, at 127.
48, Bus. Latin Am., May 10, 1978, at 152.
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sixty items, and No. 24 by 2 items. 49 The tenth meeting of LAFTA's
photographic manufacturers was held in Montevideo, in May, at
which time delegates from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela recommended the negotiation
of thirty-six additional tariff cuts for products included under the in-
dustry's Complementation Agreement No. 18. A one year extension
of concessions, until December 1979, was also requested. 50  One
problem addressed at the meeting was LAFTA's fast-approaching
free-trade deadline, now set for December 31, 1980. It was decided
that a new deadline should be set to allow the complementation ac-
cords to continue without hindrance. However, an official decision is
not likely to be reached before the Foreign Ministers Council is con-
vened, at an as yet unscheduled date.5 1
The fifteenth meeting of the pharmaceutical sector was recently
held in Montevideo, and was attended by delegates from Argentina,
Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, and an observer from the Latin American
Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries (FIFARMA). The meeting
was also attended by representatives from several international com-
panies, including Bayer, Hoechst, and Roche & Schering. Requests
were made to increase the tariff cuts on 153 previously negotiated
products and to include twenty-four new products in the industry's
Complementation Agreement No. 15. The delegates from Argentina,
Brazil, and Mexico decided to study whether paramedical products
should be established as a separate industry sector within LAFTA or
simply incorporated as a subsector of the pharmaceutical industry.
5 2
THE CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY (CARICOM)
In the face of predictions, by commentators -and member states-
men alike, of the Caribbean Community's (CARICOM) imminent col-
lapse, 53 CARICOM ministers met on July 17 and 18, in Kingston,
49. Bus. Latin Am., June 7, 1978, at 183.
50. Bus. Latin Am., June 28, 1978, at 207.
51. In the case of extending LAFTA's free-trade deadline only LAFTA's Council
on Ministers has the authority to act. To date, the Council has never met and is
unlikely to do so in light of the argument by the Andean members that the technical
conditions for a useful meeting are not present. The dilemma is apparent-only the
Council can provide the solutions which would satisfy the Andean countries and allow
the Council to meet.
52. Bus. Latin Am., June 28, 1978, at 207.
53. The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago has confessed his country's failure
to foster regional development projects and has suggested that the "near total col-
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Jamaica for the Twelfth Meeting of the Common Market Council of
Ministers, in an urgent attempt to revitalize the near-moribund inte-
gration group.
As outlined by the CARICOM Secretariat, one principal focus of
the meeting was an attempt to reverse the steady decline in intrare-
gional trade which had been precipitated by the 1977 erection of
trade barriers by member countries, in particular Jamaica, Guyana,
and Trinidad and Tobago. 54  Recently released trade statistics show
that trade between these three countries, which represent
CARICOM's three largest consumer markets, was severely con-
stricted last year. Jamaica's CARICOM imports fell an average of
$24 million in 1977.55 Exports from Trinidad and Tobago to Jamaica
dropped by forty-one percent during the first eleven months of 1977,
and, while 42.3% of Trinidad's CARICOM trade was with Jamaica,
Jamaica's trade with Trinidad declined to eleven percent of its total
CARICOM imports. And, for the first time, non-oil exports from
Trinidad and Tobago to Guyana went into the red. 5 6
While at this writing, detailed information of the progress made
at the council meeting is sketchy, it was announced that Jamaica, in a
move obviously intended to soothe the resentment caused by its fre-
quent purchases from non-CARICOM countries, will earmark $12.6
million for regional imports during the latter half of 1978, exclusive of
purchases of oil from Trinidad and Tobago and rice from Guyana.
Guyana, for its part, expressed commitment to increasing its level of
CARICOM imports, but, beyond an in-depth study of the situation,
announced no positive steps toward this goal. The Council of Minis-
ters also decided that since all the problems associated with the im-
plementation of the Community's new Origin Rules and restructured
Common External Tariff had been resolved, both arrangements would
be implemented, effective January 1979.5 7
While the convening of CARICOM's Council of Ministers was
undoubtedly the most significant event occurring within the Com-
munity in tile past few months, the CARICOM Secretariat was also
host to a series of other meetings by CARICOM ministers and offi-
lapse of the Caribbean Community Treaty may be imminent." The Times of the
Americas, Jan. 4, 1978, at 12, col. 4; Latin Am. Econ. Report, Jan. 13, 1978, at 10.
54. Caribbean Community Secretariat Press Release, No. 19/1978, July 11, 1978.
55. Latin Am. Econ. Report, June 16, 1978, at 184.
56. Latin Am. Econ. Report, Feb. 24, 1978, at 63.
57. Caribbean Community Secretariat Press Release, No. 21/1978, July 26, 1978.
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cials. These meetings included a meeting of CARICOM's Standards
Council on April 27 and 28,58 a meeting of technical officers on Mav
11 and 12 to work out a format for a CARICOM survey of the re-
gion's educational broadcasting resources, 59 an inaugural meeting on
July 4 and 5 of CARICOM law reform agencies, 60 and a meeting on
July 25 of CARICOM health ministers. 6 The Eighth CARICOM
Conference on Oils and Fats was held on July 15, 1978, to determine
the export price of copra and edible oils. 6 2
Guyana, in what appears to be a toughening of its position over
the Courantyne River dispute, recalled its ambassador to Surinam in
early April for consultation, putting further strains on the already
shaky unity of CARICOM. Sovereignty over the Courantvne River,
which forms part of the border between the two CARICOM partners,
became an issue earlier this year when Surinam banned Cuvanese
fishing in the river.6"
Estimates released by the World Bank of capital needed for
Caribbean development at $1.05 billion over the next three years.6 4
In an effort to meet this figure, the United States Agency for Inter-
American Development (USAID) has proposed that $81.7 million,
nearly one third of its Latin American development budget for 1978,
be allocated for use in the Caribbean in the form of development
assistance and bilateral development programs. 6 5
THE AMAZON PACT
Pushed through from first draft to final signature in the remark-
ably short time of fifteen months, the Tratado de Cooperaci6n
Amaz6nica was signed on July 3, 1978, by the foreign ministers of
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam, and
Venezuela, thus bringing to fruition Latin America's newest integra-
tion effort-the Amazon Pact.
In broad terms, the Amazon Pact accord resembles the associa-
tion formed by the countries of the River Plate Basin (Argentina,
58. Caribbean Community Secretariat Press Release, No. 9/1978, April 21, 1978.
59. Caribbean Community Secretariat Press Release, No. 13/1978, May 17, 1978.
60. Caribbean Community Secretariat Press Release, No. 18/1978, July 7, 1978.
61. Caribbean Community Secretariat Press Release, No. 20/1978, July 12, 1978.
62. Caribbean Community Secretariat Press Release, supra note 54.
63. Latin Am. Pol. Report, April 14, 1978, at 112.
64. Latin Am. Econ. Report, June 23, 1978, at 189.
65. Latin Am. Econ. Report, June 16, 1978, at 182.
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Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). The Pact emphasizes mutual
cooperation in scientific research and data collection, conservation of
natural resources, encouragement of border commerce and tourism,
development of road networks, building transportation and coinmuni-
cation infrastructures, and development of hydroelectric projects. 66
Unlike the River Plate Basin Treaty, however, and bespeaking the
general fear of the Amazon Basin countries of Brazilian hegemony, all
reference to a "statute of common rivers" is absent, as well as any
specific reference to physical integration of the region. Nor does tile
treaty, in contrast to the draft version, provide for a customs union.
6 7
The treaty will go into effect thirty days after the Brazilian gov-
ernment receives the ratification of the signatory countries. The first
meeting of foreign ministers is to take place within two years of that
date. An Amazon Cooperation Council, with delegates from each sig-
natory country, will meet annually to evaluate and supervise the trea-
ty's progress. All decisions adopted at the sessions must be unani-
mous. Each country is also to set up a national commission in charge
of applying the accord. 68
In an unrelated development, Galo Montano, Ecuador's trade
minister and president of the CAF, caused quite a stir, in March, by
advocating the economic integration of the countries of the Andean
Pact with the countries of the Amazon Basin.6 9 A similar furor oc-
curred last year, when, during a state visit to Brazil, Venezuelan
President Carlos Andr~s Perez and Brazilian President Ernesto Geisel
agreed that the Amazon Pact was not only viable, but that it would
provide an effective way of giving Brazil access to the Andean Pact.
70
EcoNoMIc OUTLOOK
Latin American economic prospects for 1978 and subsequent
years appear quite healthy, with the region's Gross National Product
(GNP) expected to grow an average of 5.6% during the period from
1979 to 1983. 71 Economic growth for the "big three" during this
66. Latin Am. Pol. Report, May 12, 1978, at 141. For a discussion of the organi-
zational structure and objectives of the River Plate Basin Group, see 12 Bank of
London & S. Am. Rev. 840 (1977).
67. Latin Am. Pol. Report, July 7, 1978, at 201.
68. Bus. Latin Am., July 26, 1978, at 238.
69. Latin Am. Econ. Report, Mar. 24, 1978, at 89.
70. Latin Am. Pol. Report, May 12, 1978, at 141.
71. IDB News, No. 5, July 1978, at 3.
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period is expected to range from an estimated one percent in- Argen-
tina to 4.5% in Mexico and five to six percent in Brazil. 72 Prospects
among the medium-sized countries are even more varied. Venezuela
and Ecuador expect to enjoy a robust growth of seven percent, 73
while Peru, still on the verge of bankruptcy, may suffer as much as a
three percent contraction in its GNP. 74  Increasing amounts of
foreign investment are flowing into Chile, 75 while Colombian exports
are expected to reach the two billion dollar mark, with non-traditional
exports jumping about twenty percent. 76  A downturn in commodity
market prices has somewhat dampered the prospects for future heal-
thy growth in Central America. 77 Increased government spending on
public works programs, however, will ameliorate the situation to
some extent. 78 In Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua, the GNP
is expected to grow an average of five percent. 79 In contrast, the
English-speaking countries of the Caribbean, with the notable excep-
tion of Trinidad and Tobago, are expected to remain in recession, with
their GNP's either stagnating or contracting by as much as five per-
cent. 80
A number of Latin American countries are now pursuing the
growth-with-stability model, and have exhibited an ability to success-
fully cope with the vexacious problem of inflation. An exception is
certainly Argentina where the cost of living (COL) is expected to rise
130% in 1978.81 Chile, in contrast to Argentina's run-away inflation
rate, expects that, compared with a COL increase of 63.5% in 1977,82
inflation will be held to between twenty-five and thirty percent in
1978.83 Other predicted COL increases are: Colombia, twenty-five
72. Bus. Latin Am., May 17, 1978, at 156; Latin Am. Econ. Report, April 14, 1978, at
93; Bus. Lati,- Am., Feb. 15, 1978, at 52.
73. Bus. Latin Am., July 5, 1978, at 212; Bus. Latin Am., Aug. 9, 1978, at 252.
74. Bus. Latin Am., Feb. 8, 1978, at 44.
75. Bus. Latin Am., Aug. 2, 1978, at 243.
76. Bus. Latin Am., Aug. 16, 1978, at 262.
77. Q. Econ. Rev. Guat., El Sal., Hond., supra note 34, at 7-9; Bus. Latin Am.,
Mar. 15, 1978, at 81.
78. Q. Econ. Rev. Guat., El Sal., Hond., supra note 34, at 2; Bus. Latin Am.,
Jan. 11, 1978, at 16.
79. Q. Econ. Rev. Guat., El Sal., Hond., supra note 34, at 3, 5; Q. Econ. Rev.
Nicar., Costa Rica, Pan., Jan.-April 1978, at 3.
80. Bus. Latin Am., Jan. 4, 1978, at 4-7.
81. Latin Am. Econ. Rev., May 12, 1978, at 138.
82. Chile Econ. News, No. 83, Feb. 1978, at 5.
83. Latin Am. Econ. Report, Mar. 24, 1978, at 93.
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percent; Venezuela, eighteen percent; Mexico, twelve to fifteen per-
cent; Ecuador, fifteen percent; and Brazil, forty-three percent.
8A4
The Achilles heel of Latin America will remain its balance-of-
payment position. In light of a recently completed report by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL),
however, there is room for optimism. The report, based upon a tally
of twenty-three Latin American and Caribbean countries, shows the
region to have posted a $6.0 billion payments surplus in 1977, com-
pared with $3.5 billion in 1976. While several factors contributed to
the balance-of-payments surplus as a whole, Latin America's im-
proved export performance was clearly the most important. Exports
from the area rose a healthy twenty-two percent in 1977, to $52.6
billion, while imports grew eleven percent, to $47.6 billion. 8 5
An excess liquidity resulting from slack demand in the indus-
trialized world has provided Latin American countries with a fertile
source of credit. With a turnabout to a borrower's market, debt rid-
den governments are losing no time in shaving interest costs and
stretching maturity dates through debt financing. In a parallel trend,
new loans are being arranged at lower rates to repay existing debts
contracted in the mid-1970's (or earlier) and not yet due. Banks are
not pleased with this trend, however, since early repayment means a
considerable loss of income, which is exacerbated by the need to
drastically lower interest rates on new loans to meet fierce interna-
tional competition. As a result, some countries may find that savings
on borrowing costs now will weigh heavily against them later when
bank liquidity begins to contract as the economies of industrialized
nations pick up and their demand for credit skims off avialable funds.
At that time, Latin American governments will no longer dominate
the market in loan negotiations and, bankers may be less willing to
accomodate borrowers that previously undercut their earnings.8 6
Finally, unresolved differences between the United States and
the IDB over loan policies and financial support place the future of
the Bank as an important catalyst for Latin American development
under a dark cloud. There are three major points to the conflict, the
first of which is the decision of the United States to impose its human
84. Q. Econ. Rev. Colom., Ecuador, May-Aug. 1978, at 2; Bus. Latin Am., July
5, 1978, at 214; Bus. Latin Am., May 10, 1978, at 145; Bus. Latin Am., Aug. 9,
1978, at 253; Bus. Latin Am., Feb. 15, 1978, at 53.
85. Bus. Latin Am., Apr. 15, 1978, at 107.
86. Bus. Latin Am., May 3, 1978, at 143.
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rights policy as a condition for multilateral lending. Holding 35.3% of
the IDB's voting power, the United States has reportedly vetoed sev-
eral loans to Latin American countries that are, it alleges, violating
human rights. Of the five Latin American countries that have come in
for United States criticism on human rights groUnds-Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Nicaragua-three have registered a
marked decline in their receipt of IDB loans. Second, as of the end of
April 1978, the United States was $264 million in arrears in its IDB
appropriations due to extended Congressional debate over human
rights treatment in IDB loan recipient countries. However, while in
arrears with its appropriations, the United States still holds voting
shares commensurate with its promised subscription. Third, the
United States has made no secret of its opposition to Fund for Special
Operations (FSO) lending to Latin America. FSO loans carry rates of
three to four percent, maturities of up to forty years, and grace
periods of ten years. On the other hand, ordinary capital loans, which
cost 7.5%, have short maturity dates and no grace periods. The
United States position does not augur well for the IDB's ability to
continue preferential financing for less developed Latin American
countries, whose balance-of-payments positions simply will not with-
stand loss of FSO loans. 8 7
Unless these differences are resolved, the IDB faces a drastic
curtailment of its lending ability, with a domino effect hitting banks
and companies directly or indirectly involved with IDB programs.
The problem is exacerbating already discordant United States-Latin
American relations and could even culminate in a restructuring of the
IDB itself.
87. Latin Am. Econ. Report, April 28, 1978, at 122; Bus. Latin Am., May 17,
1978, at 153.
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